

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09527 01 OF 02 081654Z

50

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 091727

O 081550Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2028

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9527

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - US STATEMENT AT TWELFTH PLENARY
MEETING, JULY 8, 1974 - TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE
NO. 51

1. FOLLOWING IS STOESSEL STATEMENT AT JULY 8 PLENARY
MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. MINISTER, ON JULY 2 THE US SIDE STATED THAT TODAY
WE WILL PRESENT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION THE VIEWS OF OUR
SIDE ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND
TOPICS TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

WE BELIEVE THAT A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS
THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO DATE IS A USEFUL WAY TO RECOGNIZE
AND DEFINE THE TASKS WHICH REMAIN BEFORE US. MOREOVER,
THIS ASSESSMENT WILL, I BELIEVE, SET AN ENCOURAGING
NOTE. WE HAVE COME FAR SINCE THESE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN
IN OCTOBER.

THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IS IN ITS
SIXTH WEEK.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09527 01 OF 02 081654Z

ROUND I WAS RECESSED AFTER FIVE WEEKS.

ROUND II WAS RECESSED AFTER SIX WEEKS.

THE VISAS OF THE US DELEGATION EXPIRE ON JULY 12, BUT WE ARE APPLYING FOR AN EXTENSION OF THIS DATE. WE SEE NO REASON FOR INTERRUPTING OUR WORK TOWARD DEFINING THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

I BELIEVE I CAN SPEAK FOR BOTH SIDES IN SAYING THAT THE TASK ASSIGNED TO US BY OUR GOVERNMENTS HAS PROVEN TO BE COMPLEX AND DEMANDING. AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS SHOWN ITSELF TO BE A SATISFYING LABOR WHEN WE CONTEMPLATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED.

THE TWO SIDES UNDERTOOK A MUTUAL OBLIGATION IN ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY OF JULY 3, 1974, TO PURSUE DILIGENTLY NEGOTIATIONS TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT GOVERNING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH AND SERIOUSNESS OF THOSE UNDERTAKINGS. IN THIS WAY, WE ARE STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE IN ALL OF OUR AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND OTHER AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

THESE PURPOSES AND CONSEQUENCES, OF COURSE, MUST REST ON FOUNDATIONS THAT ARE PRACTICAL AND DURABLE. THEREFORE, THEY MUST BE SUPPORTED BY EXPLICIT AGREEMENTS THAT ARE CLEAR AND COMPLETE.

IN ITS APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY OF JULY 1974, THE US HAS BEEN GUIDED FROM THE BEGINNING BY THREE BASIC CRITERIA. THESE ARE:

A) THE AGREEMENT MUST BE SUCH THAT PNES WILL NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE TREATY OF JULY 1974;

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09527 01 OF 02 081654Z

2) THE FACT THAT PNE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO SUCH BENEFITS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE; AND

3) THE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS INDICATED THAT IT SUBSCRIBES TO THESE SAME GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

BY VIRTUE OF OUR COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THESE CRITERIA WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL POINTS WHICH CAN SET THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT. THE IMPORTANT STRUCTURAL POINTS ON WHICH WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ARE THE FOLLOWING:

WE HAVE AGREED THAT YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS, BOTH CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC LIMITS. THIS AGREEMENT IS A QUALIFIED ONE, IN THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED THAT A CERTAIN LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE PERMITTED ABOVE THE AGREED INDIVIDUAL YIELD LIMIT. THE US REMAINS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO SUCH AN EXCEPTION.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE YIELD OF ANY INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AN AGREED FIGURE NOT GREATER THAN THE THRESHOLD YIELD ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY OF JULY 1974.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT AGGREGATE YIELDS OF GROUP EXPLOSIONS, BOTH CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC LIMITS.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF A GROUP EXPLOSION IN TERMS OF SPACINGS IN DISTANCE AND TIME BETWEEN EXPLOSIONS; AND THAT THE NUMERICAL VALUES OF THE DISTANCE AND TIME LIMITS SHOULD REFLECT THE ABILITY OF TELESEISMIC SYSTEMS TO RESOLVE AND MEASURE THE YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 09527 01 OF 02 081654Z

THE GROUP.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT ON THE FISSION YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVES, AND WE BELIEVE THERE IS AGREEMENT ON A NUMERICAL VALUE OF 0.2 KILOTONS. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE US SIDE THAT THIS LIMIT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL YIELDS, WHILE IT IS THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE THAT IT SHOULD APPLY TO YIELDS IN EXCESS OF THE THRESHOLD OF THE TREATY OF JULY 1974.

WE HAVE AGREED TO A LIMITATION ON MINIMUM DEPTH-OF-BURIAL FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS, INCLUDING THE NUMERICAL FORMULA FOR THIS LIMITATION. IT IS THE US VIEW THAT, FOR SIMPLICITY, THIS LIMITATION SHOULD BE EXPRESSED AS APPLYING TO ALL PNES.

WE HAVE AGREED TO A LIMITATION ON MINIMUM SPACING BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN AN EXCAVATION GROUP TO ASSURE THAT ESTIMATES OF YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN A GROUP COULD BE MADE WITHIN STATED ACCURACIES FROM CRATER DIMENSIONS.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT EXCAVATION GROUPS SHOULD BE LAID OUT IN SUBSTANTIALLY LINEAR FASHION, FOR THE SAME VERIFICATION REASON.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT ANY EXPLOSION PLANNED TO BE OF THE TYPE KNOWN AS RETARCS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE A CONTAINED EXPLOSION AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09527 02 OF 02 081705Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 091857

O 081550Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2029

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 9527

EXDIS

ALL OF THESE AGREED STRUCTURAL POINTS HAVE NUMERICAL VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM, FOR EXAMPLE, YIELD FIGURES. IN MOST CASES THE SPECIFIC NUMERICAL VALUES PROPOSED BY THE TWO SIDES ARE DIFFERENT. A MAJOR TASK BEFORE US IS TO FIND AGREEMENT ON ALL OF THESE NUMERICAL VALUES.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT VERIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF THE EXPLOSIONS IN A GROUP, DETERMINATION OF YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN THE GROUP, AND VERIFICATION OF

THE ABSENCE OF ANY COLLATERAL UNANNOUNCED EXPLOSION, WOULD REQUIRE ON-SITE MEASUREMENTS AND THE PRESENCE OF PERSONNEL OF THE VERIFYING SIDE. OUR TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD SPECIFYING THE TECHNICAL MEANS BY WHICH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN A GROUP CAN BE DISTINGUISHED AND THEIR YIELDS DETERMINED. MORE DISCUSSIONS ARE HOWEVER STILL NEEDED, AS WELL AS DISCUSSIONS ON THE METHODS OF VERIFYING THE ABSENCE OF ANY COLLATERAL UNANNOUNCED EXPLOSION.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF MELT SAMPLES SHOULD BE THE BASIC METHOD OF VERIFYING THE FISSION YIELD OF EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVES. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ABOUT MELT SAMPLE ANALYSIS. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE US SIDE THAT SUCH SAMPLES SHOULD BE CARRIED BY THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09527 02 OF 02 081705Z

VERIFYING SIDE TO ITS COUNTRY FOR UNRESTRICTED ANALYSIS.

WE HAVE AGREED ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHICH APPLIES TO THE DETERMINATION OF YIELDS BY TELESEISMIC MEANS.

ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHICH GO BEYOND THAT REQUIRED FOR THE TELESEISMIC DETERMINATION OF YIELD ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION IN EXPERT GROUP VI. WE HOPE THAT THESE EFFORTS WILL BE AS SUCCESSFUL AS THOSE OF EXPERT GROUP I.

IN THIS REVIEW OF OUR PROGRESS TO DATE, I HAVE SINGLED OUT ONLY MAJOR ITEMS OF AGREEMENT AS WELL AS DIRECTLY RELATED MAJOR ISSUES STILL IN NEED OF RESOLUTION. THERE IS A LARGE BODY OF AGREEMENT ON COLLATERAL ISSUES. MUCH OF THIS AGREEMENT FLOWS FROM THE WORK OF THE EXPERT GROUPS. IT IS A MEASURE OF THE SPIRIT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT MANY SPECIFIC DETAILS HAVE FOUND THEIR RESOLUTION IN OBJECTIVE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

THE MAJOR ISSUES STILL IN NEED OF RESOLUTION WHICH I HAVE NOTED IN THESE REMARKS UP TO THIS POINT ARE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY BOTH SIDES. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IN DUE TIME THESE ISSUES WILL JOIN THE EVER-LENGTHENING LIST OF AGREED POINTS.

THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL SET OF MAJOR ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN TOUCHED UPON, BUT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED DIRECTLY BECAUSE THEIR RESOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ADDITIONAL

ISSUES ARE: 1) THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS AGREEMENT TO EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, THE THIRD OF OUR BASIC CRITERIA; 2) THE ROLE OF COOPERATION IN A PNE AGREEMENT, A POINT WHICH HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED BY THE SOVIET SIDE; AND 3) OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.

WE HAVE AGREED THAT POINTS 1 AND 2 SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE HEADS OF DELEGATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09527 02 OF 02 081705Z

IT IS NOW TIME, WE BELIEVE, THAT WE DEAL IN A PLENARY WITH THE QUESTIONS OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. THE US SIDE DID ILLUSTRATE IN ROUND II IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ITS CONCEPTION OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. THERE HAS NOT, HOWEVER, BEEN A DIALOGUE. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE ON THIS SUBJECT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SUCCESS OF EXPERT GROUP I WAS BASED IN A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE INFORMATION EXCHANGED WILL BE VALID. WE MUST NOW DEVELOP OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH, IN PRACTICE, WILL ENABLE THE VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGED TO BE ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVELY.

GROUP EXPLOSIONS, BOTH CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION, ARE ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF PNE ACTIVITIES THAT WILL REQUIRE VERIFICATION THROUGH EXERCISE OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. THESE NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED.

THE US SIDE WILL RESUME THE DISCUSSION OF OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH WE INITIATED IN ROUND II. WE HAVE CONTINUED SINCE THEN TO STUDY THIS SUBJECT WITH THE VIEW OF SIMPLIFYING AND LIMITING THESE PROCEDURES, CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY OUR FIRST TWO BASIC CRITERIA. WE WILL BEGIN PRESENTING OUR CURRENT VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING.

END TEXT.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW09527
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750235-0515
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750777/aaaacqxc.tel
Line Count: 320
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 JUN 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <12 JUN 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - US STATEMENT AT TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING, JULY 8, 1974 - TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006